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If I had to enumerate the items that are 
dominating the international tax agenda, I would, 
of course, start with the taxation of the digital 
economy followed closely by the automation of 
tax assessment systems and the digitalization of 
processes. Next, there is the emphasis of 
transparency, and its relationship with corrupt 
practices and illicit financial flows. Transfer 
pricing is something of a supporting cast member 
— an important secondary issue in other debates, 
including policies on digital transactions and the 
transparency of cross-border relations. Another 
issue that is gaining traction amid automation and 
an increase in unilateral action by single states is 
environmental taxation — in particular, carbon 
taxation — which could potentially address 
harmful emissions while also helping countries 
fund efforts in accordance with the U.N.’s 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development.
I will explore each of these topics 
independently, but first I will consider the larger 
institutional picture, specifically looking at the 
role that the U.N. and the OECD play in 
international tax policy development.
The U.N., the OECD, and International Tax
The U.N. Inter-Agency Task Force on 
Financing for Development’s (IATF) 2017 report1 
provides a substantive assessment of the progress 
toward the IATF’s stated outcomes and the 2030 
sustainable development goals. It is also a helpful 
tool for clarifying the different roles that 
international organizations play in international 
tax policy development.
The U.N. and the OECD are the only 
international organizations with policymaking 
competence or, to borrow the IATF’s terminology, 
norm-setting competence. The other institutional 
stakeholders — namely, the IMF and World Bank 
— are active in the tax field, but generally offer 
policy analysis and advice at the national and 
regional levels. For example, they provide 
capacity-building programs, develop toolkits, and 
make objective recommendations to countries 
upon request.
Converging Interests and Membership Rosters
Historically, these institutions catered to 
different publics, with the OECD focusing on its 
membership of developed (or industrialized) 
economies while the U.N. served a larger, 
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U.N., “Financing for Development: Progress and Prospects — 
Report of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development 
2017” (May 22, 2017).
For more Tax Notes International content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
©
 2019 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
EMERGING ECONOMIES
198  TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, JANUARY 14, 2019
universal membership with a mandate to focus on 
developing country issues. However, recent 
developments have begun to change both the 
target audiences that the OECD and U.N. intend 
to reach and the appeal of international tax 
policies they formulate. This is the main reason 
for a degree of competition between the OECD 
and the U.N. in the tax arena.
In fact, one of the most intriguing side effects 
of the BEPS program was the OECD’s increasing 
consideration of developing country approaches, 
interests, and practices. This can be seen in the 
interaction of the G-20 countries, the Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes, and the Inclusive 
Framework on BEPS.
The OECD’s increasing attention to 
developing countries — and particularly to 
middle-income, or emerging, economies — has 
intensified the competition between the OECD 
and the U.N. for resources, media coverage, and 
even for the leadership role in policy 
development. The BEPS program did not resolve 
the lingering question: Which international 
agency will take the lead in fostering the interests 
of developing countries? And the divide is likely 
to become even blurrier as the OECD expands the 
membership of the indirect framework on BEPS 
and increases its engagement with regional tax 
organizations. On October 25, 2012, the OECD 
and African Tax Administration Forum signed a 
memorandum of cooperation, agreeing to work 
together to improve tax systems in Africa.2 Nearly 
six years later, on October 23, 2018, the OECD and 
the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations 
(Centro Interamericano de Administraciones 
Tributarios, or CIAT) signed a memorandum of 
understanding documenting their intent “to 
continue their co-operation towards promoting 
fair and efficient tax systems and administrations 
to strengthen and modernise the international 
taxation administrative structures.”3
There seems to be competition for the 
leadership role at all levels of international 
engagement, but the two groups may still differ in 
the level of participation afforded to countries at 
different stages of development.
Non-OECD countries that are members of the 
BEPS inclusive framework can influence the 
application of the BEPS program’s policies — even 
if they were not invited to participate in making 
the underlying policies. The level of globalization 
in business relations means that the BEPS policies 
would have failed to have any impact on 
commerce or global norms if not for the 
admittance of non-OECD states. However, 
engaging these states in the implementation 
phase does not necessarily mean that there has 
been — or that there will be — a fair and level 
playing field in norm-setting.
On the other hand, the U.N. has always 
included all nations. It is (and always has been) 
the international organization with the largest 
number of member countries. It has not, however, 
taken the lead in tax policymaking and has, 
instead, followed in the footsteps of the OECD in 
most of the workflows related to BEPS. The result 
is quite surprising: We are seeing a convergence of 
policies toward a global common approach in 
many different arenas. Nowhere is this 
convergence of doctrines more apparent than in 
the application of the mutual agreement 
procedure articles of the OECD and U.N. model 
treaties, as I discuss in the following section.
Illustrating the Convergence: The MAP
The main difference between article 25 of the 
OECD model treaty and the U.N. model is that the 
former suggests including a compulsory 
arbitration clause to the MAP provisions, whereas 
the latter has historically put forward an optional 
arbitration provision. As such, the U.N. model 
contains two versions of article 25. States 
following the U.N. model can choose between 
alternative A (MAP without arbitration) or 
alternative B (MAP with mandatory arbitration) 
of article 25, meaning they can chose whether to 
adopt binding arbitration to resolve disputes 
arising with their tax treaty partner under the 
context of a bilateral tax treaty.
Following the conclusion of the OECD 
multilateral instrument, the distinction between 
the OECD view and the U.N. view on MAP and 
arbitration is no longer clear-cut. The enlarged 
reach of the policies administered by the OECD, 
2
See OECD, “OECD and ATAF Strengthen Tax Co-Operation With 
Africa” (Oct. 25, 2012).
3
See OECD, “OECD and CIAT Join Forces in Promoting Stronger Tax 
Systems” (Oct. 23, 2018).
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and the need to cater to the particular needs of 
developing countries through the Inclusive 
Framework on BEPS, influenced the design of the 
MLI, making the application of the mandatory 
arbitration clause within the context of a mutual 
agreement procedure optional. This is the result 
even if the clause is not presented as optional in 
the OECD model.
It follows from the above that a country opting 
to follow article 25 alternative A of the U.N. model 
in its bilateral tax treaty negotiations could 
continue doing so while at the same time being a 
signatory of the MLI, simply by opting out of Part 
VI of the MLI.4
Although the OECD has not formally changed 
the language of its model treaty via the MLI, this 
concession exemplifies a step toward a more 
democratic, bottom-up approach to norm-setting 
in international tax policy, and it is in line with the 
solution proposed by the U.N. model.
Because the MLI only modifies bilateral tax 
treaties if both contracting states identify the 
treaty as covered by the MLI and both subscribe to 
the same provision proposed in the MLI, a 
mismatch in developed and developing country 
approaches — that is, if one party objects to Part 
VI of the MLI — means that the provision in the 
original treaty remains unchanged.
What does this signify? It means that every 
international organization that decides to cater to 
the needs of countries beyond simply a tight 
group of like-minded nations within the same 
levels of interest and economic development will 
experience the same problems that the U.N. has 
been delving into since the inception of the U.N. 
model in 1980.
With membership diversity comes greater 
complexity in the handling of tax issues and the 
drafting of tax policies: One-size-fits-all solutions 
become less feasible. That was the experience with 
the MLI, which had to foresee a range of different 
alternatives to cater to the needs of countries at 
different levels of commitment and economic 
development.
This changing reality also affected the revision 
of the transfer pricing guidelines to introduce the 
commodities price method, a simplified method 
that emerged from developing country practices. 
The latest OECD transfer pricing guidelines make 
a concession to developing countries with the 
inclusion of the commodities price method — 
more commonly called the sixth method — as one 
variation of the comparable uncontrolled price 
method. By doing so, the OECD recognized this 
approach as one of the “authorized” transfer 
pricing methodologies. With this endorsement, 
the sixth method became mainstream: This is a 
positive outcome for the developing and 
emerging economies that were already applying 
it, as well as for other countries that are looking to 
adopt more streamlined, objective approaches to 
transfer pricing. The U.N. transfer pricing manual 
recognizes the sixth method as an independent 
method, raising it to the same level as all other — 
some would say more traditional — 
methodologies.
Ultimately, the assimilation of non-traditional 
practices and recognition of alternative 
approaches is likely to become a standard 
experience if the OECD continues to expand its 
membership to include emerging economies like:
• Chile, which became the first South 
American country to accede to the OECD in 
May 2010;
• Colombia, the 37th country to join the 
OECD in accordance with an accession 
agreement signed on May 30, 2018;
• Costa Rica, which has been undergoing the 
accession process with the OECD since 2015; 
and
• Brazil, which requested accession to the 
OECD in February 2018, although the 
OECD’s website does not list it as a country 
undergoing the formal accession program.
Further, the changing face of the OECD can be 
seen in — and will continue to influence — the 
debate on the digital economy. Originally, the 
OECD did not intend for BEPS action 1 to create a 
new international tax order to address digital 
activity. However, the debate has moved in that 
direction. What role will the G-20, the newest (and 
potential future) OECD members, and the 
members of the inclusive framework have in that 
debate? How can developing countries, for the 
first time since the creation of the inclusive 
framework, effectively influence the digital 
4
Tatiana Falcão, “Granting Juridical Autonomy to Article 25(5) of the 
Tax Treaty Model,” 4 British Tax Review 453 (Nov. 2017).
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debate to ensure any potential new rules — rules 
that will no longer be designed by OECD 
countries for OECD countries —consider their 
unique needs? These questions are unresolved, 
but will be up for debate in 2019. It is the 
responsibility of international organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the larger 
institutional stakeholders to make sure they get 
addressed.
The Digital Economy
The existing international tax framework 
requires some form of physical presence to give a 
country the right to tax an entity’s income. This is 
the underlying premise behind article 7 of most 
double tax treaties and the source allocation rules, 
as well as the concept of a permanent 
establishment, whether the PE arises from the 
provision of a service, an agent’s signing of 
contracts, or a physical establishment. Physical 
presence in a country is the key to establishing the 
country’s right to tax corporate profits.5
The digital economy challenges this long-
standing concept because the use of digital and 
non-physical networks allows multinational 
enterprises to be economically active in a 
particular country or region despite having little 
or no substantive physical presence therein. This 
new reality circumvents the rules that determine 
taxable presence and threatens to erode the tax 
base of source countries.
In this context, a source country is any country 
with a consumer market; the market does not 
need to be large or substantial. It simply requires 
an economically relevant consumer market that 
an entity can target remotely, through the internet, 
or through a mix of virtual and physical 
engagement. In this era of globalization, it is fair 
to say that all markets are subject to digital 
economic exploration.
Under the existing international tax 
framework, allocating taxing rights to a source or 
resident state is almost always synonymous with 
conferring taxing rights on a developing or 
developed country, respectively. The digital 
economy debate is changing that. For the first 
time, the source-versus-residence split is not 
synonymous with the split between developing 
and developed countries, or between 
industrialized and emerging economies.6
Being able to capture rent from digital activity 
in a consumer market on a source basis is in the 
interest of every state. Thus, all countries have an 
interest in behaving like source states. The 
digitalization of the economy has spurred new 
debates on the establishment of nexus and 
economic substance in source states.
Nexus is essentially the criteria that connects a 
multinational enterprise’s business profits to a 
location. There are numerous proposals for what 
should qualify as a nexus in the digital age. It 
could simply be the presence of a large consumer 
market in which the MNE operates. It could refer 
to an MNE’s efforts to engage systemically in the 
economy of a country, use of local infrastructure, 
or delivery of goods or services to that country. 
Other suggested nexus criteria include the 
presence of a user base — notably, user base is not 
necessarily synonymous with consumer base 
because it may not be capable of generating value 
— or marketing intangibles.
Substance refers to the level of engagement in 
a particular economy. Basically, substance 
determines whether the interaction with a given 
economy is only incidental to the business — 
meaning it should not be subject to tax — or 
whether the interaction is intentional and directed 
toward a specific consumer market.
Some, myself included, have suggested that 
the digitalization of the traditional ways of doing 
business calls for a revision of the traditional ways 
in which we allocate income to source and 
residence states. I have argued in favor of creating 
a digital permanent establishment test, which 
would rely on the concepts of nexus and 
substance.7 Notably, however, taxing some digital 
business models might not require a total 
reformulation of existing international tax rules. 
For example, the existing international tax rules 
could be sufficient to allow the source state to 
5
Falcão, “Taxing the Digital Economy — Policy Considerations and 
How to Advance the Debate,” Tax Notes Int’l, Feb. 12, 2018, p. 623.
6
Falcão, “Taxing Online Advertising Services: Driving Policy 
Approaches From Case Law Analysis,” Tax Notes Int’l (forthcoming 
2019).
7
Falcão, “Taxing the Digital Economy,” supra note 5.
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capture the income that online advertisers 
generate.8
International bodies have yet to reach 
consensus on these matters. While the 
institutional stakeholders try to find a global 
solution, developed countries with large 
consumer markets are unilaterally taking steps to 
ensure that they can tax any profits that offshore 
digital enterprises derive from their domestic 
consumer base.
Recently, both the United Kingdom and Spain 
initiated formal consultations to assess the market 
impact of a unilateral digital services tax. In the 
United Kingdom, HM Treasury is considering the 
suitability of an interim 2 percent tax on digital 
services pending international agreement on a 
long-term solution.9 Likewise, the Spanish 
government issued a consultation exploring a 3 
percent digital services tax on companies with an 
annual turnover above €750 million and Spanish 
sales in excess of €3 million. Meanwhile, the EU 
has proposed a draft council directive as part of a 
package of measures aimed at tackling businesses 
engaged in digital activities. Under the proposed 
directive, “on the common system of a digital 
services tax on revenues resulting from the 
provision of certain digital services” (COM(2018) 
148 final), the EU would impose a digital services 
tax of 3 percent on companies with worldwide 
revenue over €750 million annually and annual 
revenue from EU digital activity over €50 million.
Many other countries are considering how 
they might address digital business activities 
using unilateral withholding taxes, turnover 
taxes, or the VAT system.
India — a leader among the middle-income 
countries when it comes to the development of 
novel approaches — has gone so far as to insert a 
“significant economic presence” test into its 
domestic tax legislation.10 This change enables 
India to negotiate for the inclusion of a new nexus 
rule based on a significant economic presence in 
double tax agreements moving forward.
The pieces of the digital economy puzzle were 
laid in 2018. Time will tell whether 2019 will be 
the year in which the international community 
will resolve the puzzle.
Unilateral Taxes: Fees for Technical Services
2018 also saw the release of the new U.N. 
model, which included a brand new article 12A 
on “fees for technical services.” If included in a 
bilateral treaty, article 12A — numbered to avoid 
disrupting the traditional numbering of articles in 
the model convention(s) — allows a contracting 
state to tax fees for specific technical services paid 
to a resident of the other contracting state on a 
gross basis at a rate negotiated by the contracting 
states. The relevant services are those of a 
managerial, technical, or consultancy nature.11
The introduction of article 12A was among the 
most controversial agenda items that the U.N. Tax 
Committee of Experts has considered in recent 
years. Introduced at the request of developing 
nations, it creates a significant distinction between 
the U.N. and the OECD models. Under the OECD 
model — and under the U.N. model before the 
introduction of article 12A — income from 
services was taxable exclusively by the residence 
state unless the enterprise carried on business 
through a PE or fixed base in the source state.
Article 12A does not include any threshold — 
such as PE, fixed base, or minimum period of 
presence in a contracting state — as a condition 
for the taxation of fees for technical services. 
Therefore, from a policy perspective, it provides 
an incentive for an enterprise engaged in business 
in the source state to incorporate in that state to 
qualify for net income taxation on the technical 
services provided in or to that state. In that sense, 
it is an efficient tool to curb tax avoidance and 
evasion.12
Article 12A attempts to answer long-standing 
concerns raised by developing countries. But it 
does not fully answer all those concerns because it 
only allocates gross taxing rights on technical 
services — not services in general — although the 
8
Falcão, “Taxing Online Advertising Services,” supra note 6.
9
HMRC, “Digital Service Tax: Budget 2018” (Oct. 29, 2018).
10
Indian Ministry of Finance, “The Finance Bill, 2018,” Chapter 3 
(Direct Taxes), clause 4 (amendment of section 9), explanation 2A (Feb. 1, 
2018); and Indian Ministry of Finance, “Provisions Relating to Direct 
Taxes, Finance Bill 2018,” (Feb. 2, 2018) (see explanation to clause 4, 
“‘Business Connection’ to Include ‘Significant Economic Presence’”).
11
Falcão and Bob Michel, “Scope and Interpretation of Article 12A: 
Assessing the Impact of the New Fees for Technical Services Article,” 4 
Brit. Tax Rev. 336 (Oct. 2018).
12
Falcão, “The U.N. Model’s New Fees for Technical Services 
Provision,” Tax Notes Int’l, July 23, 2018, p. 367.
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commentaries concede that some countries might 
want to expand the article to include all services 
by eliminating the word “technical.”
Regardless, article 12A is a first step toward 
more assertive source-country taxation that 
should help avoid the erosion of the source 
country’s tax base while also simplifying the 
administration of taxes at the source-country 
level.
A brief review of its application in the tax 
treaty context is sufficient to conclude that article 
12A is extremely effective. An astounding 
number of treaties now in force or awaiting 
ratification contain an article like the U.N. model’s 
12A, a development that occurred within a 
relatively short time frame. This demonstrates 
that developed countries have been willing to 
agree to a policy that developing countries sought 
out.13
Could a unilaterally devised withholding tax 
system — one that is effective in capturing rent on 
a recurrent basis and easy to administer — be the 
new normal?
Automation in Tax Collection
The digitalization of businesses and business 
transactions has also affected the way 
governments issue and assess taxes. This 
phenomenon can help relieve some of the 
pressures that tax administrations, particularly in 
developing countries, face in training and 
retaining personnel to assess and collect taxes.
The topic of automation of tax collection is 
related to several other movements in the 
international tax arena, including the emphasis on 
transparency in tax collection and enforcement, 
the increased exchange of information, and the 
overall goal of simplifying the process of charging 
and assessing taxes.
Climate Change
The U.N.’s 2030 agenda and the 15 sustainable 
development goals link together many of the 
topics discussed in this article, including 
automation in the collection of taxes, 
digitalization, and environmental taxation. These 
three seemingly unconnected topics are now 
united by a common goal of mobilizing resources 
for sustainable development.
The economic impact of climate change is a 
topic that has already captured the attention of 
policymakers, and it is likely to become an 
increasingly important part of the international 
policy agenda reflected in the sustainable 
development goals. Although there is a specific 
goal for climate change, at least nine of the other 
sustainable development goals involve 
environmental protection. Many policymakers 
are now considering how to mobilize resources to 
protect against the harmful effects of climate 
change while also investing in new technologies 
that will help eliminate carbon dioxide emissions 
— the root cause of climate change.
The most objective — and direct — approach 
is simply to put a price on carbon. That can be 
achieved through a market-based approach. 
Emissions trading system have been introduced 
in the EU (Directive 2003/87/EC), Canada (in 
Ontario and Quebec), and China (in 2018). 
Likewise, carbon taxes have been implemented in 
British Columbia, Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden.
In 2017 the U.N. created the Subcommittee on 
Environmental Taxation under the framework of 
the U.N. Tax Committee and, in doing so, put the 
topic on its agenda for the next three years.14 The 
subcommittee began its work by looking at 
carbon taxes because they are recognizably one of 
the most effective instruments in changing 
consumer behavior.15 To the extent one can impose 
a higher tax on the more carbon-intensive product 
and a lower tax on the least carbon-intensive 
product, the tax alone provides a price incentive 
for consumers to shift to buying the least carbon-
intensive fuels and products.
Further, carbon taxes are easy to administer, 
assess, and collect. Their imposition does not 
require auditing because the chemical properties 
of a fuel are enough to determine the carbon 
content of that fuel even before combustion. 
13
Falcão and Michel, supra note 11.
14
Falcão, “Taking the Environmental Tax Agenda Forward: How the 
U.N. Committee of Experts Can Lead the Way,” Tax Notes Int’l, Mar. 5, 
2018, p. 949.
15
U.N., Seventeenth Session of the Subcommittee on Environmental 
Taxation, “Environmental Tax Issues,” E/C.18/2018/CRP.14 (Oct. 2, 2018).
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Therefore, as long as the tax is imposed at the 
uppermost level of the production chain, it can 
address all of the fuel’s potential for pollution 
from the outset in an almost automated fashion.16 
Not only is a carbon tax simple and capable of 
being applied with little oversight from the tax 
administration, it can generate revenues that can 
be used to advance the climate change cause — or 
address other items on the U.N.’s list of 
sustainable development goals, such as helping to 
eradicate poverty or improve education.
Several countries have introduced carbon 
taxes, and some have years of experience 
administering them. For example, many Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden) have relied on them for many years for 
many purposes, including revenue mobilization. 
Here, the U.N.’s role will be to bridge the gap 
between developed and developing countries and 
share success stories so that other countries can 
follow suit. This is especially important because, 
despite their many advantages, there are no 
examples of carbon taxes in the developing world.
The U.N. is taking the lead in developing a 
larger legal framework for the widespread 
application of carbon taxes. The OECD has 
monitored the application of environmentally 
related taxes for many years, but does not delve 
into policymaking in this field. The IMF is 
involved in environmental taxation as well, but it 
takes an economic approach to the topic.
In the wake of creating “new” taxes that can 
help meet goals set by the international 
community, raise revenue for development, and 
provide for the self-determination of nations by 
allowing them to keep sovereign rights over their 
tax basis, questions arise: What overarching 
principles should be observed? What is a fair 
allocation of taxing rights? Quotation marks are 
used to denote novelty because these are not new 
taxes, rather a tax basis that a particular 
policymaker has not yet addressed.
Before exploring this topic further, I will 
comment briefly on two other “new” taxes — 
cryptocurrency taxation and robot taxation — and 
discuss their potential effects.
Cryptocurrency Taxation
Arguably, the cryptocurrency market — along 
with other markets based on a virtual financial 
product including initial coin offering systems — 
is the product of several different yet interrelated 
phenomena, some of which are tax-related and 
others are not. If one had to locate the 
cryptocurrency market, it could arguably be 
placed at the intersection of the digitalization of 
services and markets, globalization of financial 
services, increased regulatory standards for the 
traditional financial services industry, and 
growing transparency measures.
Trading in cryptocurrency is, in part, a 
response to the tightening regulatory standards 
and higher transparency thresholds in the 
traditional financial and capital markets that have 
made it harder to disguise illegitimate capital 
flows and to hold previously untaxed income in a 
foreign jurisdiction. These more stringent 
standards may have inspired the development of 
a parallel deregulated financial market — a 
market that many now believe demands greater 
regulatory scrutiny itself as part of the BEPS 
project and related efforts.17
The characterization, taxation, and regulation 
of cryptocurrencies and cryptocurrency markets 
are policy issues that require urgent 
consideration. New measures should ensure 
parity between the taxation of digital and non-
digital financial markets, hence increasing 
countries’ ability to control these markets and 
collect revenue related to digital transactions. 
Failing to do so could result in substantial 
setbacks in the many achievements that 
policymakers have obtained to date, particularly 
through the various frameworks for increased 
transparency. A lack of regulation could increase 
the potential for illicit financial flows, tax evasion, 
and tax avoidance using blockchain technologies.
Also, the anonymity of the parties involved in 
blockchain transactions may make it difficult for 
tax authorities to identify the effective beneficiary 
of income or even simply trace the transaction 
back to one person or country, thus increasing 
illicit and criminal activities involving 
16
Falcão, A Proposition for a Multilateral Carbon Tax Treaty, IBFD 
Doctoral Series (forthcoming).
17
Falcão, “A Token of Elucidation in the Taxation of Initial Coin 
Offerings,” Tax Notes Int’l, Aug. 20, 2018, p. 791.
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cryptocurrency, including the untapped flow of 
financial resources arising from corruption and 
money laundering.18
Achievements like country-by-country 
reporting, the common reporting standard, the 
U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 
beneficial ownership registries, and heightened 
standards for exchange of information might all 
be rendered ineffective if the new digital financial 
market is not regulated.
Robot Taxation
Another question that repeatedly arose in 
international fora in 2018 was whether one should 
apply a tax to the mechanization of activities. The 
question is whether an automation tax — or a 
“robot tax” as it is popularly called — is a suitable 
solution to the impending (at least in theory) loss 
of jobs and funding for social security welfare 
systems if companies use robots as workers, 
substituting automated labor for human labor.
This discussion involves the concern that the 
development of artificial intelligence and further 
automation could lead to a loss of jobs and, as a 
result, the loss of personal income tax revenues 
and social security contributions.
To cut this subject short, I have always 
believed that if the objective of a robot tax is to 
make up revenue lost because of job destruction, 
there are other measures that could offset this loss 
without impairing technological progress. One 
familiar option: a carbon tax, discussed earlier in 
this column. A carbon tax would compensate for 
the lost revenue as a result of automation, while 
also conferring a positive impact on the 
environment — a double positive and thus a 
much better solution to this impending problem, 
which is merely one of revenue generation.
Conclusion
The digital tax and trade revolution are 
happening at the same time as nations call for 
greater sovereignty and independence in the 
allocation and administration of taxes. This can be 
seen in Brexit, an increased allocation of territorial 
taxing rights in the United States, and the plea for 
greater allocation of source taxing rights in 
developing countries. Even as they fight for 
opposing interests, these movements all involve 
the will to keep the tax base domestic.
Policymakers will have to respond to these 
claims as they draft new normative approaches 
that can address all the issues brought about by a 
globalized, digital world.
Tax base allocation can stop the next major 
wave of immigration by preventing displacement 
due to climate change; it can increase nationally 
derived sources of revenue; and, to the extent 
formal employment increases, it should decrease 
the need for overseas development assistance. 
This will make nations more independent, 
increase economic self-determination, and 
enforce the sovereignty of nations19 — all while 
reinforcing the universality of tax regimes and the 
need for international tax coordination. 
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